Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
1997

Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nüremberg?
Michael P. Scharf
Case Western Reserve University - School of Law, michael.scharf@case.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Courts Commons, and the International Law Commons

Repository Citation
Scharf, Michael P., "Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nüremberg?" (1997). Faculty Publications.
300.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/300

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

HAVE WE REALLY LEARNED

1995]

65

HAVE WE REALLY LEARNED
THE LESSONS OF NUREMBERG?*
MICHAEL

P.

SCHARF**

I. Introduction
The Nuremberg Tribunal was the first international criminal
tribunal in modern times. It's Charter and Judgment are among the
most significant developments in international law in this century.
But, like any novel endeavor, the Nuremberg Tribunal has engendered its share of criticism)
Yet, Nuremberg must be judged, not by contemporary standards, but through the prism of history. Viewed within the historic
context, it was extraordinary that the major German war criminals
were even given a trial, rather than summarily executed as had
been proposed by Churchill and Stalin at the Yalta Conference in
1945.2 With this in mind, Justice Robert Jackson, the Chief
Prosecutor of Nuremberg, began his opening speech for the prosecution by stating: "That four great nations, flushed with victory and
*Address presented 17 November 1995 during "Nuremberg and the Rule of
Law: A Fifty-Year Verdict," a Conference co-sponsored by The Center for National
Security Law, University of Virginia, The Center of Law, Ethics and National
Security, Duke University School of Law, and The Center for Law and Military
Operations, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. The
Conference was held in the Decker Auditorium, The Judge Advocate General's School,
United StatesArmy, Charlottesville, Virginia, November 17-18,1995.
**A graduate of Duke University School of Law, Professor Scharf now teaches
international law, human rights law, international criminal law, and criminal law at
the New England School of Law in Boston. From 1989-93, Professor Scharf was an
Attorney-Advisor in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the United States Department
of State, where he served initially as Counsel to the Counter-Terrorism Bureau and
later served as Attorney-Advisor for United Nations Affairs, United States
Representative to the Sixth (Legal) Committee during the 1991 and 1992 sessions of
the United Nations General Assembly, and as a member of the United States
Delegation to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 1993. Professor
Scharf has written several articles on the establishment of an international criminal
court and is the author of a recently published two-volume book entitled An Insider's
Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which contains a chapter comparing and contrasting the Yugoslavia and Nuremberg Tribunals.
!See generally A. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG (1987); R. CONOT, JUSTICE
AT NUREMBERG (1983); A. TUSA & J. TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1983).
2TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 29-32 (1992). Stalin
had proposed that 50,000 German General Staff Officers should be executed, while
Churchill had favored executions for a short list of only the most prominent German
war criminals. Roosevelt was noncommittal. It was not until President Harry Truman
took office two months later, that the United States made it clear that it opposed
summary execution and supported instead the establishment of a tribunal to try the
German leaders.
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stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the
most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to reason."3
This is not meant to exonerate Nuremberg or excuse its shortcomings. Even Robert Jach:son acknowledged at the conclusion of
the Nuremberg Trials that "many mistakes have been made and
many inadequacies must be confessed."4 But he went on to say that
he was "consoled by the fact that in proceedings of this novelty,
errors and missteps may also be instructive to the future." 5 The
question, then, is have we learned from the mistakes of Nuremberg?
As the first international tribunal since Nuremberg, we must examine the Yugoslavia Tribunal for the answer to this question.

II. Has the Yugoslavia Tribunal Avoided the Shortcomings
of Nuremberg?
There were four main criticisms levied on Nuremberg. First,
that it was a victor's tribunal before which only the vanquished were
called to account for violations of international humanitarian law.
Second, that the defendants were prosecuted and punished for
crimes expressly defined for the first time in an instrument adopted
by the victors at the conclusion of the war. Third, that the
Nuremberg Tribunal functioned on the basis of limited procedural
rules that inadequately protected the rights of the accused. And
finally, that it was a tribunal of first and last resort, because it had
no appellate chamber. On paper, the Yugoslavia Tribunal appears to
have avoided a repeat of these inadequacies, but the practice of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal to date may suggest a different story.
A. Victor's Justice
Elsewhere, I have written that in contrast to Nuremberg, the
Yugoslavia Tribunal was created neither by the victors nor by the
parties involved in the conflict, but rather by the United Nations,
representing the international community of states.6 Yet, this is
somewhat of an oversimplification. The decision to establish the
Yugoslavia Tribunal was made by the United Nations Security
Council, which has not remained merely a neutral third party;
rather, it has become deeply involved in the conflict.
aRobert H. Jackson, Opening Speech for the Prosecution at Nuremberg (21 Nov.
1945) [hereinafter Opening Speech].
'Robert Jackson, Repmt to the President (Oct. 7, 1946).
5Jd.
61 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 332 (1995).
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The Security Council has imposed sanctions on the side perceived to be responsible for the conflict, 7 authorized the use of force,S
and sent in tens of thousands of peacekeeping personnel.9 Its
numerous resolutions have been ignored and many of its peacekeeping troops have been injured or killed; some have even been held
hostage. Moreover, a compelling argument can be made that the
Security Council has (justifiably) favored the Bosnian-Muslims over
the Serbs throughout the conflict. Although it imposed sweeping economic sanctions on Serbia; such action was never even considered
when Croatian forces committed similar acts of ethnic cleansing.
During the conflict, the Council has been quite vocal in its condemnation of Serb atrocities, but its criticisms of those committed by
Muslims and Croats has been muted.
Although the Yugoslavia Tribunal is supposed to be independent from the Security Council, one cannot ignore that the
Tribunal's prosecutor was selected by the Security Council and its
judges were selected by the General Assembly from a short list proposed by the Security Council. While the Tribunal has jurisdiction to
prosecute any one responsible for violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, it is perhaps no surprise that
the indictments so far have been overwhelmingly against Serbs. As
long as the jurisdiction of ad hoc tribunals is triggered by a decision
of the Security Council, and the prosecutors and judges are selected
by the Council, such tribunals will be susceptible to the criticism
that they are not completely neutral.

B. Application of Ex Post Facto Laws
Perhaps the greatest criticism of Nuremberg was its perceived
application of ex post facto laws, by holding individuals responsible
for the first time in history for waging a war of aggression. The first
to voice this criticism was Senator Robert Taft of Ohio in 1946, but it
was not until John F. Kennedy reproduced Taft's speech in his
Pulitzer Prize winning 1956 book, Profiles of Courage, that this criticism became part of the public legacy of Nuremberg.l 0
7S.C. Res. 757 (30 May 1992).
BS.C. Res. 770 (13 Aug. 1992) (authorizing force to facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian assistance in Bosnia); S.C. Res. 816 (31 Mar. 1993) (authorizing force
to enforce the "no fly zone" over Bosnia); S.C. Res. 820 (17 Apr. 1993) (authorizing
forceful measures to prevent violations of economic sanctions.imposed on Serbia).
9See e.g., S.C. Res. 761 (29 June 1992) (dispatching peacekeepers to ensure the
security of Sarajevo airport); S.C. Res. 762 (30 June 1992) (dispatching peacekeepers
to "pink zones" in Croatia); S.C. Res. 776 (14 Sept. 1992) (dispatching peacekeepers to
other parts of Bosnia to facilitate delivery of aidJ; S.C. Res. 819 (16 Apr. 1993) (dispatching peacekeepers to "safe areas" in Bosnia).
lOJOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 228-30 (commemorative ed. 1964).
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The creators of the Yugoslavia Tribunal went to great lengths
to ensure that the Tribunal would not be subject to a similar criticism. Thus, in drafting the Tribunal's Statute, the Secretary-General
required that the Tribunal's jurisdiction be defined on the basis of
"rules of law which are beyond any doubt part of customary international law."ll In its proposal for the Tribunal's Statute, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the world's leading
authority on international humanitarian law, "underlined the fact
that according to International Humanitarian Law as it stands
today, the notion of war crimes is limited to situations of international armed conflict."l2
In the first case to be heard before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the
defendant, Dusko Tadic, challenged the lawfulness of his indictment
under Article 2 (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and
Article 3 (violations of the customs of war) of the Tribunal's Statute
on the ground that there was no international armed conflict in the
region of Prijedor, where the crimes he was charged with are said to
have been committed. In a novel interpretation, the Yugoslavia
Tribunal's Appeals Chamber decided by a four-to-one vote that,
although Article 2 of the Tribunal's Statute applied only to acts
occurring in international armed conflicts, Article 3 applied to war
crimes "regardless of whether they are committed in internal or
international armed conflicts."l3
The Tribunal based its decision on its perception of the trend in
international law in which "the distinction between interstate wars
and civil wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned."l4 While Professor Meron has argued convincingly for acceptance of individual responsibility for violations of the Geneva
Conventions and the Protocols additional thereto in the context of
internal armed conflict, 15 such recognition would constitute progressive development of international law, rather than acknowledgment
of a rule that is beyond doubt entrenched in existing law. In addition
to avoiding the ex post facto criticism, there is a second important
reason why the Tribunal should have exercised greater caution in
construing its jurisdiction: states will not have faith in the integrity
of the Tribunal as a precedent for other ad hoc tribunals and for a
II Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993), reproduced in 2 MoRRIS &
ScHARF, supra note 6, at 3.
1 2 Preliminary Remarks of the International Committee of the Red Cross (22
Feb. 1993) reproduced in 2 MoRRIS & ScHARF, supra note 6, at 391.
13Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, at
68, IT Doc. IT-94-1-AR72 (2 Oct. 1995). Judge Li dissented from this conclusion.
14Id. at 54.
15 See Theodor Meron, International Criminilization of Internal Atrocities, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995).
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permanent international criminal court if the Tribunal is perceived
as prone to expansive interpretations of international law.

C. Violations of Defendant's Due Process
The Nuremberg Tribunal has been severely criticized for allowing the prosecutors to introduce ex parte affidavits against the
accused over the objections of their attorneys.16 Such affidavits, it
has been argued, seriously undermined the defendant's right to confront witnesses against him. The United States Supreme Court has
expressed the importance of this right as follows: "Face-to-face confrontation generally serves to enhance the accuracy of fact finding
by reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an
innocent person."17
On August 10, 1995, the Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal issued a two-to-one decision, holding that the identity of
several witnesses could be withheld indefinitely from the defendant,
Dusko Tadic, and his counsel, even throughout the trial, to protect
the witnesses and their families from retribution.18 This decision is
troubling in two respects. First, like Nuremberg, the Yugoslavia
Tribunal decided to elevate the protection of victims above the
accused's right of confrontation, notwithstanding that Article 20 of
the Tribunal's Statute requires that proceedings be conducted "with
full respect for the rights of the accused," and with merely "due
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses." Second, and
most worrisome of all, the Yugoslavia Tribunal rationalized its decision on the ground that the Tribunal is "comparable to a military
Tribunal" which has more "limited rights of due process and more
lenient rules of evidence."19 It then cited favorably the (the oft-criticized) practice of the Nuremberg Tribunal of admitting hearsay evidence and ex parte affidavits with greater frequency than would be
appropriate in domestic trials.ZO Unfortunately, the Tribunal's rules
do not permit an interlocutory appeal from this decision of the Trial
Chamber, which will thus not be reviewed until after the completion
of the trial.

!BSee TELFORD TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 174, 241; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
TO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 27 (1993).
17Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 ( 1990).
rsoecision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Protective Measures for Victims and
Witnesses, IT Doc. IT-94-I-T (10 Aug. 1995) [hereinafter Protective Measures for
Victims and Witnesses].
I9Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, supra note 18, at 15.
20/d.
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D. Right of Appeal
A final criticism of Nuremberg was that it did not provide for
the right of appeal. The Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been
recognized as constituting a major advancement over Nuremberg by
guaranteeing the right of appeal and providing for a separ.ate court
of appeal. However, the procedure for the selection of judges did not
differentiate between trial and appellate judges, leaving the decision
to be worked out by the judges themselves. When they arrived at
The Hague, this became the subject of an acrimonious debate,
because nearly all the judges wished to be appointed to the appeals
chamber, which was viewed to be the more prestigious assignment.
As a compromise, the judges agreed that assignments would be for
an initial period of one year and subject to "rotat[ion] on a regular
basis" thereafter.21
The rotation principle adopted by the judges is at odds with the
provisions of the Tribunal's Statute that were intended to maintain
a clear distinction between the two levels of jurisdiction. Article 12
provides that there shall be three judges in each Trial Chamber and
five judges in the Appeals Chamber, and Article 14(3) expressly
states that a judge shall serve only in the chamber to which he or
she is assigned. These provisions were meant to ensure the right of
an accused to have an adverse judgment and sentence in a criminal
case reviewed by "a higher tribunal according to law," as required by
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. As recognized by the International Law Commission, the
purpose of the principle of the double degree of jurisdiction under
which judges of the same rank do not review each other's decision is
to avoid undermining the integrity of the appeals process as a result
of the judges' hesitancy to reverse decisions to avoid the future
reversal of their own decisions.22 The rotation principle, therefore,
undermines the integrity ofYugoslavia Tribunal's appellate process.

III. Conclusion
I have previously written that "[t]he Statute represents a
marked improvement over the scant set of rules that were fashioned
for the Nuremberg Tribunal. The Statute and the Rules provide the
necessary framework for ensuring that the [Yugoslavia] Tribunal
will comply with international standards of fair trial and due
2 1Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted on 11 Feb. 1994,
amended on 5 May 1994, 4 Oct. 1993, further revised on 30 Jan. 1995), U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.3 (30 Jan. 1995), reprinted in MoRRIS & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 41.
22Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth
Session, at 323, U.N. Doc. N48/10 (1993).
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process and avoid the criticisms of its predecessor."23 In light of the
subsequent developments described above, I may have been too optimistic in my assessment. The Yugoslavia Tribunal's record so far can
only be described as a mixed one. It can, and must, do better. With a
half century of development of standards of international due
process since Nuremberg to draw from, the Yugoslavia Tribunal's
shortcomings cannot be excused as a product of the times.
To paraphrase Robert Jackson again, if we pass the defendants
in an international trial a poisoned chalice, it is we, the international community, who ultimately are injured. The record on which we
judge Mr. Tadic today, will be the record on which history judges the
entire effort to prosecute crimes before an international tribunaJ.24
If the Yugoslavia Tribunal can demonstrate that such an institution
can function effectively and fairly, then the case for establishing
future ad hoc tribunals or a permanent international criminal court
will be strengthened beyond measure.

& SCHARF, supra note 6, at
24Qpening Speech; supra note 3.

23MORRIS

333-34.

